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Abstract 
When new forensic evidence becomes available after a conviction there is no systematic framework to help lawyers 
to determine whether it raises sufficient questions about the verdict in order to launch an appeal. This paper pre-
sents such a framework driven by a recent case, in which a defendant was convicted primarily on the basis of audio 
evidence, but where subsequent analysis of the evidence revealed additional sounds that were not considered during 
the trial. The framework is intended to overcome the gap between what is generally known from scientific analyses 
and what is hypothesized in a legal setting. It is based on Bayesian networks (BNs) which have the potential to be a 
structured and understandable way to evaluate the evidence in a specific case context. However, BN methods suf-
fered a setback with regards to the use in court due to the confusing way they have been used in some legal cases in 
the past. To address this concern, we show the extent to which the reasoning and decisions within the particular case 
can be made explicit and transparent. The BN approach enables us to clearly define the relevant propositions and 
evidence, and uses sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of the evidence under different assumptions. The results 
show that such a framework is suitable to identify information that is currently missing, yet clearly crucial for a valid 
and complete reasoning process. Furthermore, a method is provided whereby BNs can serve as a guide to not only 
reason with incomplete evidence in forensic cases, but also identify very specific research questions that should be 
addressed to extend the evidence base and solve similar issues in the future.
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Background
Extensive research is being undertaken in various scien-
tific disciplines to extend the evidence base that can help 
the detection, collection, and analysis of forensic evi-
dence (INTERPOL 2013). Such empirically based knowl-
edge, together with experiential insights, can begin to 
address questions regarding the way in which evidence 
behaves [e.g. (French and Morgan 2015)] to assess the 
probability of observations under proposed defence and 
prosecution hypotheses. In practice, the personal opin-
ion of the expert, based on their experience, is generally 
accepted by the court as valid evidence (Morgan and Bull 
2007; R v. Weller 2010; The Law Commission 2011). Even 
though this kind of expert judgment can be informative, 
especially in the absence of an empirical evidence base, 
these subjective arguments raise questions about issues 
such as the validation of the arguments put forward by 
the expert (National Research Council 2009) and suscep-
tibility to cognitive influences on the interpretation of 
evidence under uncertainty (Kassin et al. 2013; Nakhaei-
zadeh et al. 2014). Similarly, interpretation issues can be 
faced by the court when experts do provide empirical 
evidence, due to the lack of agreement and consistency 
in the application of current interpretation approaches 
(National Research Council 2009), and the difficulties 
in presenting the reasoning processes of the scientists 
transparently in court (Sjerps and Berger 2012).
Approaches to interpretation
To offer a scientific methodological approach to the 
forensic interpretation and decision-making process, 
the case assessment and interpretation (CAI) model was 
developed in the late nineties by Cook et  al. (1998b). 
This framework requires one to make a structured and 
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systematic assessment of the requirements, questions, 
and outcomes of the analysis to optimise the contribution 
of the evidence to the case (Jackson et al. 2013). Because 
the formulation of the hypotheses is of high significance 
in the interpretation of the evidence (Fenton et al. 2014), 
it is important to consider the hypotheses that the dif-
ferent stakeholders realistically can address, using their 
expertise, to come to a defendable conclusion. Therefore, 
Cook et al. developed the so-called hierarchy of proposi-
tions as part of the CAI (1998a) model, in which relevant 
hypotheses are defined at the offence, activity and source 
levels. While the scientist is able to make inferences on 
the source and activity level, the ultimate question of 
guilt at the offence level lies with a judge or jury.
To make inferences and guide decision-making, logi-
cal reasoning processes such as multivariate analyti-
cal methods can be used (Dawid and Evett 1997). One 
of these methods is the use of Bayesian networks (BNs) 
(Fenton and Neil 2012; Taroni et  al. 2014), which has 
been applied to the interpretation of various kinds of evi-
dence, including DNA (Evett et  al. 2002), fire incidents 
(Biedermann et  al. 2005), gunshot residue (Biedermann 
et al. 2009; Fenton et al. 2014), glass (Zadora 2009), and 
document examinations (Biedermann et  al. 2011). In 
BNs, one can graphically formalise the probabilistic 
(uncertain) relations between the hypotheses in ques-
tion and the available evidence. These are represented as 
nodes, and the relations are formalised in node probabil-
ity tables (NPTs). New evidence is incorporated by using 
Bayes’ theorem to update the previous (prior) belief in a 
hypothesis to a new (posterior) probability in the light of 
the strength of this evidence. Equivalently, it is also possi-
ble to compute the overall likelihood ratio (LR) of pieces 
of evidence (either individually or in combination) with 
respect to any particular hypothesis; the benefit of the LR 
approach is that it avoids the need to define prior prob-
abilities for hypotheses that are not themselves condi-
tioned on other hypotheses or evidence.
Despite the research successes, the Bayesian approach 
in a legal setting suffered a setback as a result of the case 
of R v. T (2010), which questioned the use of probabilistic 
approaches in court with regards to shoeprint evidence. 
This led to significant debates about the role of Bayesian 
approaches in presenting evidence types that do not have 
an established statistical base akin to DNA and more 
generally, how forensic evidence should be presented in 
court (Berger et  al. 2011; Hamer 2012; Morrison 2012; 
Redmayne et al. 2011; Robertson et al. 2011). Thompson 
(2012) concluded that, in order to avoid such problems 
in the future, the forensic scientist should only receive 
necessary and specific information, valid scientific bases 
should accompany their presented evidence, their rea-
soning processes should be transparent and lastly, the 
results should be presented to legal professionals in an 
understandable way. This could all be better regulated 
by the use of LRs (Thompson 2012), although [as was 
demonstrated in (Fenton et  al. 2014)], there are several 
important limitations and caveats that need to be con-
sidered when using the likelihood ratio to summarise the 
impact of evidence in a Bayesian argument. Ultimately, 
if strategic and cultural challenges (such as support for 
and understanding by the criminal justice system) can be 
overcome, the Bayesian approach could become the cen-
tral method for the evaluation of evidence (Fenton et al. 
2013a).
Objectives
This paper aims to contribute to overcoming the afore-
mentioned challenges by showing how BNs can be used 
to structure and represent the set of information and 
questions in the context of a criminal case, as a struc-
tural and transparent tool to evaluate the value of new 
evidence that is acquired in the stages prior to an appeal 
hearing. It presents a method to develop the BN that 
captures the relation between the acquired forensic 
evidence and the proposed hypotheses. The BN is sub-
sequently used to help define the experimental stud-
ies necessary to evaluate the new evidence, to infer the 
evidentiary value of the newly acquired evidence, and to 
evaluate the evidence that is of most value to the hypoth-
esis of interest.
Case study
In the case we consider here, the defendant was con-
victed of attempted murder. In summary (the full details 
are provided in “Requirements and case pre-assessment” 
section), the young child of the defendant was taken to 
hospital with serious injuries after an alleged incident 
took place while the baby and the defendant were alone 
in a room. The defendant allegedly hurt the baby, result-
ing in blood stains belonging to the baby being found on 
the wall in the room. One of the key items of evidence 
presented by the prosecution was an audio recording 
of an emergency services call that the defendant made 
immediately after the incident. On the recording there 
were distinct sounds that the prosecution claimed to be 
linked to the criminal act, namely the defendant scrap-
ing blood off a wall. During the trial, the jury was asked 
to decide whether or not they could be sure of either of 
the alternative counts on the indictment: attempted mur-
der or causing grievous bodily harm with intent. After 
the defendant was convicted of murder, questions were 
raised by the defence team that led to an appeal process 
being set in place, where the audio evidence was re-ana-
lysed by an audio expert. Following this, the most impor-
tant sections in the grounds of appeal were:
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  • the prosecution theory concerning the recorded sound 
was presented during the trial as if it was an estab-
lished fact without any evidence from an expert, and
  • new reports of the defence expert undermine the 
contention that the sound in question must have 
been made by scraping blood off the wall.
Content
This paper firstly provides an overview of the methods 
that are used to define the relevant propositions, cre-
ate the network and evaluate the evidence in this case 
(“Methods” section). The subsequent sections present 
the requirements and case pre-assessment applied to the 
case study (“Requirements and case pre-assessment” sec-
tion), the BN created using this information (“The BN 
models for the case” section), and the assessment of the 
evidentiary value of the new evidence (“Evaluation of the 
evidential values” section).
Methods
The propositions and the Bayesian network (BN)
All the original case materials were made available and 
were examined to identify the propositions, at different lev-
els, that were of importance in the trial and subsequently 
addressed in the preparation for the appeal. Once the rel-
evant propositions and required outcomes were set, a BN 
was created using the basic connective structures and build-
ing methods previously discussed in the literature (Fenton 
et al. 2013b; Taroni et al. 2004), where the presented propo-
sitions represent the arguments raised by the defence and 
prosecution in the original case. The BN was then extended 
by incorporating the newly gained information in prepa-
ration for the appeal and created using the freely available 
software package AgenaRisk (AgenaRisk 2015).
Conditional probabilities and inference methods
When revising the probabilities for a pair of prosecution 
(Hp) and defence (Hd) hypotheses in the light of n items 
of evidence, the posterior probabilities P(Hp|E1, . . . ,En) 
and P(Hd |E1, . . . ,En) can be found using Bayes’ theorem, 
which can be derived from the general laws of condi-
tional probability: the prior probability is multiplied with 
the support that the new evidence (E1, . . . ,En) provides 
for the hypotheses:
By dividing these probabilities, we get the ‘odds’ form 
of Bayes theorem which shows that the posterior odds 
are the product of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio. 
P
(
Hp|E1, . . . ,En
)
=
P(E1, . . . ,En|Hp)
P(E1, . . . ,En)
· P(Hp)
P(Hd |E1, . . . ,En) =
P(E1, . . . ,En|Hd)
P(E1, . . . ,En)
· P(Hd)
Providing that the pair of prosecution and defence 
hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (mean-
ing that Hd is equivalent to “not Hp”) the likelihood ratio 
on its own is a valid measure of probative value of the 
evidence (E1, . . . ,En) on the pair of hypotheses (Fenton 
et al. 2014). Specifically, if the LR > 1 the evidence sup-
ports Hp (with higher values offering greater support) 
and if the LR < 1, the evidence supports Hd (with lower 
values offering greater support). This is very attractive 
for forensic scientists since it means they can assess the 
probative value of the evidence without having to provide 
any prior probability for hypothesis Hp. However, while 
computing the LR is simple for a single piece of evidence 
[the expert only has to provide two likelihoods P(E|Hp) 
and P(E|Hd)], when there are multiple pieces of (possi-
bly) dependent evidence along with other unknown but 
related hypotheses, the computation of the probabilities 
P(E1, . . . ,En|Hp) and P(E1, . . . ,En|Hd) needed for the 
LR requires a full inference over the entire BN model that 
captures all of these dependencies.
In the BN model, we only have to provide ‘local’ likeli-
hoods of individual evidence nodes given the parents—
these can be extracted from the case information where 
available, and stored in the NPTs. Once the BN structure 
is created (showing the conditional dependent relations) 
and these ‘local’ likelihood values are provided for the 
NPTs, the over-all likelihood ratio for any set of evidence 
with respect to any hypothesis node can be obtained 
by running the model in BN software (e.g., AgenaRisk, 
Hugin). Specifically for evidence E = {E1, . . . ,En} when 
we run the model with observations for that evidence, the 
model computes (for any hypothesis node H), the value 
P(H |E) [and P(notH |E), which must be 1− P(H |E)]. 
But, rearranging the formula for the odds version of 
Bayes, we get: 
where P(H) is the marginal prior probability value for H 
when the model is running without any observation for 
the evidence nodes. So, the BN computation provides the 
correct LR value for E with respect to H.
Representation of case information
To translate the verbal scales used in the case documen-
tation to numerical probabilities, the translation table 
presented by Morgan (2009) was used. Even though it 
is recognized that this translation is still subjective, it is 
P
(
Hp|E1, . . . ,En
)
P(Hd |E1, . . . ,En)
=
P(E1, . . . ,En|Hp)
P(E1, . . . ,En|Hd)
·
P
(
Hp
)
P(Hd)
= likelihood ratio · prior odds
LR =
P(E|H)
P(E|notH)
=
P(H |E)
P(notH |E)
·
P(notH)
P(H)
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merely used to show how BNs can be used in cases where 
likelihoods are or can actually be reliably assigned. How-
ever, if there is insufficient information regarding such 
probabilities (such as a lack of databases or experimen-
tal studies), the probabilities are represented as a variable 
which can be studied across a range of possible values.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to investigate the evidential value of each item of 
evidence to the hypothesis of interest a sensitivity analy-
sis was performed. Such an analysis allows one to identify 
those with the strongest evidential value, by calculat-
ing and comparing the probabilities of the target node 
with and without assumed states for (a combination of ) 
the evidence nodes. For example, by comparing P
(
Hp
)
 , 
P(Hp|E1 = e1), and P(Hp|E2 = e2). The results of such 
changes will be visualised in a so-called tornado graph.
Additionally, the effect when the missing conditional 
probabilities are actually obtained was assessed. This 
method was designed to result in a transparent reason-
ing process which is understandable by legal profession-
als and jurors, and addresses some of the issues raised by 
Thompson (2012) which are summarised in “Approaches 
to interpretation” section.
Requirements and case pre‑assessment
Case information
From the case documentation, it follows that, in relation 
to the audio evidence, the following information can be 
observed:
  • A baby was injured during an incident on the top 
floor of a house
  • Blood from the baby was found on the wall in one of 
the rooms upstairs
  • On an audio recording of the emergency telephone 
call made by the suspect, a scraping sound (allegedly 
indicating scraping blood off a wall) can be heard 
(hereafter referred to as sound 1 at time t1)
  • The suspect was charged with attempted murder.
The audio evidence played a significant role in the trial. 
However, the assessment of observing the evidence that 
would be expected if the suspect did indeed scrape blood 
off the wall was not supported by any empirical studies or 
past experiences. During the appeal preparation process, 
the recorded emergency call was re-analysed by an audio 
expert on behalf of the defence, and four other sounds 
were identified on the same recording that, according 
to the expert, showed similarities to sound 1. In particu-
lar, one of these sounds (referred to as sound 2) was of 
interest because of background noise that could be heard 
simultaneously at this time t2. This expert statement pro-
vides evidence for both the activity causing sound 1 and 
the activity causing sound 2. The background noise was 
presumed to be the television, which was located in a dif-
ferent room to where the prosecution argued the scrap-
ing of the blood took place. In summary, the following 
additional information was added in the preparation for 
the appeal:
  • The proposition that the suspect was rubbing his 
face was given as an alternative explanation by the 
defence for the explanation of sound 1 (in what fol-
lows we assume that these two hypotheses are mutu-
ally exclusive)
  • A second sound (sound 2) was noted on the emer-
gency recording, which, according to the audio 
expert, showed similarities to sound 1
  • During this second sound, the TV (located down-
stairs) could be heard simultaneously on the emer-
gency recording
  • A statement by the police reads that the suspect was 
frequently rubbing his face in their presence
Questions
Following the available information, the questions of 
interest (from an offence to a source level) to the case can 
be defined as:
  • Did the suspect attempt to murder the victim?
  • Did the suspect inflict any injuries on the victim?
  • Did the suspect scrape blood off the wall during the 
emergency call causing sound 1 (time t1)?
  • Are sound 1 and 2 similar?
  • Can the TV be heard during sound 2 (time t2) if the 
suspect was positioned in the room upstairs?
Clearly, the formulation of the questions in the case 
assessment stage will impact the structure of the BN. For 
example, asking (as was the case in the trial)
“were the sounds similar”
is different from asking:
“were the sounds produced by the same activity?”
unless a similarity is defined as such. This highlights 
the importance of precisely defining the meaning of the 
terms used in the assessment.
Propositions
The ultimate question is whether the suspect attempted 
to murder the victim—as was the final statement in the 
trial. The other counts that were presented to the jury 
were innocence or causing GBH. Factors of relevance 
(and discriminatory power) to the three counts are the 
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degree of preparation, motive, opportunity, intent, and 
whether or not the criminal action actually took place. It 
is argued by Fenton et al. (2013b) that because opportu-
nity, motive and intent are causes or pre-conditions for 
the offender to commit the crime, they should be paren-
tal nodes in a BN model. The same can be said about 
the degree of preparation (or malicious aforethought), 
which has a significant role in distinguishing between the 
counts of attempted murder and causing GBH. However, 
keeping in mind the objective of the appeal—to provide 
evidence which might influence the initial decision—only 
the propositions that are of relevance to the new evidence 
needs to be reassessed and is of relevance to the defence. 
The main forensic evidence available in this case relates 
to the question of whether the suspect scraped blood off 
the wall (which is subsequently said to be linked to the 
act of inflicting injuries on the victim). Hence, our BN 
model focuses only on source level hypotheses, ignoring 
the offence level hypotheses and the associated difficul-
ties of modelling factors like opportunity, motive and 
intent.
The evidence presented in the trial to support the scrap-
ing/rubbing propositions was that of the sound, which 
is consistent with the suspect scraping blood. Ideally, of 
course, these hypotheses should be accompanied by an 
analysis that discusses the validity and accuracy of the 
evidence presented. However, as this was not done in the 
trial, it will therefore not be taken into consideration in 
this model. Statements about the presence of the other 
evidence types are defined similarly. Thus, the proposi-
tions presented in this case are:
  • The suspect scraped blood off the wall at time t1, and 
the alternative the suspect rubbed his face at time t1.
  • A sound that is consistent with the suspect scrap-
ing blood at time t1 is observed on the recording, and 
a sound that is consistent with the suspect scraping 
blood at time t1is not observed on the recording,
  • The suspect scraped blood off the wall at time t2, and 
the suspect rubbed his face at time t2.
  • A sound that is consistent with the suspect scraping 
blood at time t2 is observed on the recording, and a 
sound that is consistent with the suspect scraping 
blood at time t2 is not observed on the recording,
  • Sound 1 and sound 2 are similar, and sound 1 and 
sound 2 are not similar.
  • The TV can be observed on the recording at time t2 , 
and the TV cannot be observed on the recording at 
time t2,
  • The police observed a frequent rubbing activity by the 
suspect, and the police did not observe a frequent rub-
bing activity by the suspect.
These propositions highlight some important con-
siderations in the inference process when one wants to 
assess LRs applied to real cases. The prosecution (scrap-
ing activity) and defence (rubbing activity) hypotheses 
are assumed to be mutually exclusive but not exhaus-
tive, since the proposition that it is caused by another 
activity is not considered (Fenton et al. 2014). In theory, 
such a third hypotheses of ‘other activity’ could have 
been included in the activity nodes, if it were not for 
the fact that questions such as ‘what is the probability of 
observing a similarity between a sound caused by scrap-
ing and one caused by any other activity’ are not possi-
ble to address using empirical data. Because of this, for 
example, a LR of 1 does not indicate that the evidence 
does not have any probative value: even though it might 
reduce the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses by 
equal amounts, it could increase the posterior probabil-
ity of the third ‘other’ hypothesis (Fenton et  al. 2014). 
Therefore, the LR will merely be used to determine 
whether the evidence provides more or less (or equal) 
support for one of the hypotheses over the other, rather 
than that it represents the aforementioned probative 
value of the evidence. This emphasizes the importance 
of formulating and thinking about the case information 
and desired and feasible outcomes before defining ques-
tions and hypotheses by using, for example, the Case 
Assessment model.
The BN models for the case
The relationship between the propositions defined in 
“Propositions” section and the evidence that can support 
or refute these hypotheses are now made explicit in the 
BN models.
The trial
In the trial, the prosecution hypothesis that the suspect 
scraped blood off the wall causing a sound at time t1 (
a1p
)
 was used to support the proposition that the sus-
pect might have inflicted injuries to the victim. At this 
stage, the defence did not have an alternative state other 
than that ‘the suspect did not scrape blood off the wall at 
time t1’ (a1d). To support their hypothesis, the prosecu-
tion presented an audio recording (E1) on which sound 1 
could allegedly be heard. The dependency between these 
is causal in such a way that the scraping activity causes 
the sound to be created, and therefore recordable and 
observable. This item of evidence can be heard (e1), or 
simply not be heard (e¯1) to support or oppose the scrap-
ing proposition, and does not depend on the standpoint 
of either of the parties. The network that captures these 
nodes and the relation between them can be found in 
Fig. 1.
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The appeal
In the preparation for the appeal, the state for the defence 
proposition a1d changed when they provided the alterna-
tive explanation that the suspect was rubbing his face at 
t1. The second sound (A2) can now be added to the net-
work with the accompanying evidence (E2). The assump-
tion is made that the activities causing both sounds are 
dependent in such a way that if the suspect is acting in 
a certain way at time t1, it is reasonable to assume this is 
related to the activity at time t2. Following the case infor-
mation, there is a link between whether or not the tele-
vision could be heard (TV ) and the activity causing the 
second sound, due to the distance between the location 
of the TV and the specific wall. Additionally, the evidence 
on the similarity (S) between the sounds is conditionally 
dependent on, logically, the activities that caused both 
sound 1 (A1) and sound 2 (A2). The last piece of evidence 
relevant to these propositions is a statement given by the 
police (P) that a police officer observed a frequent rub-
bing activity by the suspect. The new network is shown in 
Fig. 2, highlighting the node (A1) that is of ultimate rel-
evance to the appeal.
The conditional probabilities
In order to perform the necessary Bayesian inference to 
determine the impact of the evidence we must provide all 
of the NPTs for the model. Typically, these are provided 
either from data, experimentation or expert judgment. In 
the absence of substantive data, in what follows we con-
sider ranges of values where relevant and perform sen-
sitivity analysis over them, relying on the wording used 
in the case documentation and the verbal scale transla-
tion table shown in Table  1. As discussed before, these 
probabilities are merely used to how BNs can be used in 
cases where probabilities can be assigned based on more 
robust empirical grounds.
The activity nodes A1 and A2
The prior probability of activity 1 being scraping is 
unknown, since this may depend on background infor-
mation that is not available in this case. Additionally, it 
was assumed that there is a dependency between the two 
activities where it is a bit more likely that A2 (with states 
a2p and a2d) has a certain state given that this was also 
the case during the first activity: 
Note that in the remainder of this paper only the 
(unique) state names will be used to refer to the state of 
the nodes in the equations to maintain conciseness [e.g. 
P(A2 = a2p|A1 = a1p) = P
(
a2p|a1p
)
].
The audio evidence E1 and E2
The first evidence to assess are the sounds that are audi-
ble on the recording, which will be modelled in the same 
way and are claimed to be scraping sounds by the pros-
ecution. Therefore, if the suspect was scraping the wall 
at the particular times (node states a1p and a2p), it is 
expected that the audible sound appears to be scraping: 
E1 and E2 are very likely to be present (node states e1 
and e2):
P(A1 = a1p) = x
P(A2 = a2p|A1 = a1p) = P(A2 = a2d |A1 = a1d) = 0.6
P(e1|a1p) = P(e2|a2p) = 0.95
Suspect scraped blood 
off the wall (A1) 
Audio recording at 
time  (E1) 
Fig. 1 Bayesian network capturing the trial arguments related to the 
audio evidence
Suspect scraped blood off 
the wall at time  (A1) 
Audio recording 
at time  (E1) 
Suspect scraped blood off 
the wall at time  (A2) 
Police statement (P) Similarity between sound 1 and sound 2 (S) 
Audio recording 
at time  (E2) 
TV can be heard 
at time  (TV) 
Fig. 2 Bayesian network capturing the hypotheses and acquired evidence in the case
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If, however, the suspect was rubbing his face at the par-
ticular times (a1d and a2d), not much can be said about 
observing a scraping sound since the required informa-
tion for the conditional probability is unavailable:
Evidence of similarity S
Following the expert statement of the audio expert, a cer-
tain level of similarity is observed between sound 1 and 2 
(with states S = s and S = s¯). The probability of observ-
ing a similarity (S = s) between these sounds if they are 
produced by the same activity is assumed to be almost 
certain:
The probability of observing a similarity between the 
two sounds given that each of the sounds are caused by a 
different activity is not assessed. This information is how-
ever crucial for the likelihood ratio of the ultimate hypoth-
esis in this case (whether the suspect scraped blood off the 
wall) and therefore assessing the support of evidence of the 
expert witness statement on the degree of similarity:
In order to obtain these probabilities, experimental 
studies should have been performed in which the case 
situation is simulated and the different sounds resulting 
compared.
Police statement P
The probability of the police observing a rubbing activ-
ity and writing this into a statement (states P = p and 
P = p¯) is higher if at both times the suspect rubbed his 
face than if he only did this at one point (e.g. an increase 
by 0.05), and less likely if the suspect was scratching the 
wall both times (e.g. a decrease by 0.05). Additionally, 
knowing that the suspect was scraping the wall at both 
points in time does not give an indication as to the likeli-
hood of observing P. Since the relative values in the NPT 
are more important rather than the exact value of the 
P(e1|a1d) = P(e2|a2d) = y
P(s|a1d , a2d) = P(s|a1p, a2p) = 0.99
P(s|a1d , a2p) = P(s|a1p, a2d) = z
conditional probability, the following assumptions are 
made: 
Evidence regarding the background noise from the TV
Because the television was, according to the case records, 
positioned in a downstairs room relatively far away from 
the upstairs bedroom in which the scraping allegedly 
took place, it is considered to be a lot more likely that the 
television could not be heard (TV = tv) than that it could 
(TV = tv), given that the suspect was scraping the wall at 
time t2:
The full set of (conditional) probabilities for the BN 
model is presented in Fig. 3.
Evaluation of the evidential values
It follows from the BN in Fig. 3 that the probability of A1 
is conditional and depends on different factors that need 
to be assessed. Even though there is scope for disagree-
ment regarding the probabilities and assumptions, it is 
possible to make inferences from the BN that can aid the 
interpretations of evidence within the case.
Evidential value and experimental studies
The question that is of interest in a legal setting is: ‘does 
the new appeal evidence change the belief in a1P’? And if 
so, given the aim of the defence for the appeal: ‘does the 
presence of the new appeal evidence lower the probabil-
ity of a1P’? The variables x, y and z discussed in the previ-
ous section are different in such a way that x (the prior 
probability of a1P) is based on human considerations 
while attempts can be made to approach a more precise 
value of y and z through experimental studies. However, 
because the expert statement regarding the audio evi-
dence does not provide any information about the likeli-
hood of observing a similarity between two sounds that 
are caused by a different activity (z), key evidence is miss-
ing to come to any conclusion. Figure 4 shows how, for 
y = 0.5, a difference in the z-value changes the LR to such 
an extent that the evidence supports different hypotheses 
depending on this value: 
  • For 0 ≤ z < 0.35, LR < 1, indicating that the evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the suspect was under-
taking a normal behaviour, which is beneficial for the 
defence.
P(p|a1p, a2p) < P(p|a1d , a2p)
= P(p|a1p, a2d) < P(p|a1d , a2d)
P(p|a1p, a2p) = 0.5
P(tv|a2p) = 0.1
P(tv|a2p) = 0.9
Table 1 Probability ranges for  verbal descriptions, taken 
from Morgan (2009)
Verbal term Probability range
Virtually certain >0.99
Very likely 0.9–0.99
Likely 0.66–0.9
Medium likelihood 0.33–0.66
Unlikely 0.1–0.33
Very unlikely 0.01–0.1
Exceptionally unlikely <0.01
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  • For 0.35 < z < 1.0, LR > 1, indicating that the evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the suspect was under-
taking a ‘suspicious’ behaviour, which is beneficial for 
the prosecution.
Following this, Fig.  5 shows that the evidence either 
supports the defence (LR  <  1, dark points) or the pros-
ecution (LR  >  1, light points) depending on the values 
for the unknowns y and z. This is especially the case for 
higher values of y.
As noted before, the LR only provides information 
about to what extent the evidence supports one of the 
hypotheses over the other. However, the court is inter-
ested in addressing which of the two hypotheses is more 
likely based on the evidence (confusing these two is 
labelled the prosecutors fallacy). In order to do this, we 
need to incorporate the prior probabilities of the pros-
ecutor and defence hypotheses, a value which can vary 
depending on the background information that one 
assumes to be present (P(Hp = x)). Figure  6 shows the 
results of varying the prior assumption x and the (cur-
rently) unknown value of y. A point in the graph indicates 
a1p a1d a2p a2d
a1p a2p 0 6 0 4 tv 0 1 0 5 
a1d a2d 0 4 0 6 tv 0 9 0 5 
a1p a1d a2p a2d
e1 0 95 y e2 0 95 y 
e1 0 05 1 y e2 0 05 1 y 
a1p a1d a1p a1d
a2p a2d a2p a2d a2p a2d a2p a2d
p 0 5 0 55 0 55 0 60 s 0 99 z z 0 99 
p 0 5 0 45 0 45 0 40 s 0 01 1 z 1 z 0 01 
Suspect scraped blood off 
the wall at time  (A1) 
Audio recording 
at time  (E1) 
Suspect scraped blood off 
the wall at time  (A2) 
Police statement (P) Similarity between sound 1 and sound 2 (S) 
Audio recording 
at time  (E2) 
TV can be heard 
at time  (TV) 
Fig. 3 Bayesian network for the appeal case including the conditional probabilities
Fig. 4 LR of the prosecution (scraping) and defence (rubbing) 
hypotheses for values of z Fig. 5 The evidence either supports the defence (LR < 1, dark points) 
or the prosecution (LR > 1, light points) depending on the values for 
the unknowns y and z
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that for that specific combination of x and y, varying 
the value of the other unknown, z, can cause a switch in 
which sides’ hypothesis is most likely based on the evi-
dence presented at the trial. This is especially the case 
for lower x values (which would favour the defence) and 
higher y values (also in favour of the defence). Because of 
this, the defence should be very careful in presenting the 
new evidence in its favour when insufficient information 
is given by the expert with regards to the other unknown 
variables. However, if experimental studies were to show 
that the two possible activities do produce dissimilar 
sounds (and the value of z tends towards zero), the expert 
evidence reduces the posterior probability of the defend-
ant scraping the wall greatly, which was the aim of the 
defence. Experimental studies are therefore needed to 
offer the empirical evidence base to establish the missing 
parameters in a Bayesian network, leaving less room for 
speculations.
Most influential items of evidence
A sensitivity analysis was performed to identify the items 
of evidence that have the most impact on the hypoth-
esis A1 (whether the activity that caused the first sound 
was related or unrelated to the crime). Because y cannot 
be determined using the current case information, it is 
assumed that, given that the activity was rubbing, no dis-
tinction can be made between the two possible states of 
the evidence node (a y-value of 0.5). The prior probability 
x of (A1 = a1p) is also set to 0.5 since no background evi-
dence is assumed to be present before the evidence was 
presented at the trial. Since the defence assumed a low 
value for z, a value of 0.1 is used. Note that these values 
are only selected in order to show the effect and interac-
tion of the items of evidence and are not used to show the 
evidential value.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented 
in the form of a tornado graph, see Fig.  7. The verti-
cal line shows the prior probability where no evidence 
is assumed to be present yet (P(a1p) = 0.5). For each of 
the other nodes in the network, the bars represent the 
extent an assumption about their state impacts the belief 
Fig. 6 Graph showing the cases where the evidence can benefit 
both the defence and prosecution hypotheses. A point in the graph 
indicates that, for that specific combination of the x and y value, a 
variation in the z-value can change the beneficiary of the evidence
Fig. 7 Results of the sensitivity analysis showing which nodes have the most influence in changing the belief in the prosecution hypothesis of A1
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that the suspect was scraping blood off the wall at time t1. 
It follows from Fig. 7 that the probability of the suspect 
scraping the wall is most impacted by the presence of the 
two sounds, followed by the observations regarding the 
TV and the police statement. In this case, the evidence of 
similarity has negligible impact, since no assumptions are 
made regarding the presence of the two sounds.
The subsequent assumption is made that the items of 
evidence E1 and E2 are observed to draw further infer-
ences. Figure 8 shows the results of the sensitivity analy-
sis. Because of the chosen state of E1 and E2, the evidence 
now favours the prosecution without considering any of 
the other evidence: P(a1p|e1, e2) = 0.68. It follows that 
the evidence of similarity between the sounds is most 
important, which can vary the probability of a1p between 
0.51 and 0.77. Subsequently, the evidence related to the 
television and the observation of the police statement are 
less significant in changing the belief in a1p. However, 
because the value of a2p is not known, the related items 
of evidence are dependent where a change in the belief 
of S influences the state of the television evidence. To 
further assess this issue, a similar analysis is performed 
where the evidence of similarity is assumed to be present 
(Fig. 9). The posterior probability of a1p increased to 0.77 
without considering the states of the police statement 
and TV evidence. It follows that the television evidence 
can change the probability of a1p to lower (0.45) or higher 
(0.84) than its prior (0.5). This sensitivity analysis thus 
shows that the inclusion or exclusion of items of evidence 
in the interpretation process can have a great impact on 
the significance of other items. Without the presence of 
the television evidence, the evidence on the similarities 
brought forward by the defence actually increases the 
probability of the prosecution hypothesis. 
Fig. 8 Results of the sensitivity analysis showing the variation of a1p for fixed states of E1 and E2
Fig. 9 Results of the sensitivity analysis showing the variation of a1p for fixed states of E1, E2 and S
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Conclusion
This study has demonstrated how the Bayesian frame-
work of reasoning can be used to explore how items of 
evidence are related to each other and to the relevant 
hypotheses, illustrated by a real case. It highlighted the 
importance of assessing the information and defining 
the questions and propositions at different levels before 
creating the BN model. When one makes reasonable 
and justifiable decisions regarding aspects such as con-
ditional independence, integrity of expert evidence and 
assumptions that are made in favour of the defence or 
prosecution, the BN can be a useful tool to provide trans-
parent and workable results regarding the relevance of 
new items of evidence.
The changes in the key posterior probability was shown 
to be dependent on the different assumptions, ultimately 
showing that the incomplete defence expert evidence 
could also work to weaken the defence case. More spe-
cifically, the evidence about similarity of the sounds is the 
most valuable when aiming to address the activity level 
proposition, followed by the observation of the TV evi-
dence. Because of this, it is important that experimental 
studies are undertaken in order to define the probabilistic 
relationships (Morgan et  al. 2009), a process which can 
be guided using the presented methods. Additionally, it 
was shown that the importance of certain items of evi-
dence is influenced by the true state of others, illustrat-
ing the importance of evaluating the dependencies and 
incorporating all the relevant available evidence.
This research therefore addresses a critical issue within 
the forensic sciences. The importance of presenting—in 
a holistic, transparent and reproducible manner—all the 
relevant evidence and hypotheses is, we believe, para-
mount for optimising the use of valuable forensic evi-
dence in court. This approach enables judges and juries 
to evaluate the weight of not only individual items of 
evidence in a case but also identify the interaction of dif-
ferent items of evidence within that case to be able to 
draw conclusions. Such an approach offers a significant 
step that enables forensic science to address a number of 
the critiques that have been made in recent years, and to 
ensure that the value of physical evidence continues to 
be realised in forensic investigations and the pursuit of 
justice.
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